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The Legal Cost of the "Split Double
Header" of Gratz and Grutter
by WENDY PARKER*
Introduction
In a short opinion in the law school affirmative action case,
Grutter v. Bollinger,' Justice Scalia predicts that the majority's
approval of race-conscious decisionmaking in Grutter,2 coupled with
the Court's disapproval of a similar program in Gratz v. Bollinger,3
will dramatically increase litigation.' He predicts that the "split
Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.A., 1986, The
University of Texas; J.D., 1990, The University of Texas School of Law. Co-Counsel,
Brief of the Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
University of Michigan Law School. See Brief of Amici Curiae Society of American Law
Teachers, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). Julie Kerr provided
invaluable research assistance. I would also like to thank Sara Cable, Editor-in-Chief, and
Chris LeGras, Senior Articles Editor, for extending me the opportunity to be included in
this Special Issue.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. See id. at 342.
3. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also
Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1628 (2003) (concluding
that the Michigan opinions "will likely encourage affirmative action opponents to mount
more litigation challenges"); Marcia Coyle, The Fallout Begins: In Its Final Week of the
Term, the Supreme Court Gives Legal Backing to Two Kinds of Diversity, NAT'L LAW J.,
July 7, 2003, at 1 (quoting Curt Levey, director of legal affairs for the Center for Individual
Rights: "'Grutter and Gratz together make it virtually inevitable there will be a lot of
litigation on the narrow tailoring grounds."'); Curt A. Levey, Colleges Should Take No
Comfort in the Supreme Court's Reprieve, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., July 18, 2003, at 11
(predicting that "the decisions will instead be a road map for bitter and costly litigation.
Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion in Grutter identifies enough prospective issues to keep a
small army of attorneys busy until retirement."); Steve Miller & Stephen Dinan, More
Lawsuits Likely on Affirmative Action, WASH. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A-12 ("The most
tangible outcome of yesterday's split Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action will
be another round of lawsuits over what's acceptable and what's illegal for colleges and
universities."); Terence J. Pell, Camouflage for Quotas, WASH. POST, June 30, 2003, at A-
15 (writing that Gratz and Grutter "laid the groundwork for more litigation"); Diana Jean
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double header" of Gratz and Grutter will be a never-ending
aggravation for both students and educators because of a high level of
uncertainty in distinguishing between constitutional racial activity and
the unconstitutional kind.' In fact, Justice Scalia predicts that post-
GratzlGrutter litigation will draw all racial groups - the majority
group, underrepresented minority groups, and overrepresented
minority groups - as plaintiffs.6 By contrast, Justice Scalia proposes
that an all-or-nothing approach - one outlawing all racial preferences
in the public education setting or one upholding such activity as a
general matter - would be preferable for its certainty, from the
standpoint of legal costs, than the ambiguous course charted by the
Michigan opinions, Gratz and Grutter.7
One could respond to Justice Scalia by claiming that legal
certainty is of little value or that increased litigation costs to answer
that uncertainty is of minor concern, but that is not my approach.
Instead, I take as a given the value of legal certainty8 and challenge
the positivist aspect of Justice Scalia's claim that Gratz and Grutter
will produce legal uncertainty that the courts will resolve.9 In a
nutshell, I argue that Justice Scalia wrongly characterizes Gratz and
Grutter as producing mountains of litigation to mark the line between
permissible and impermissible racial conscious activity.
Schemo, Group Vows to Monitor Academia's Responses, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A-
22 (quoting Terence J. Pell, president of Center for Individual Rights, as saying that the
Supreme Court's approach "increases considerably the odds that there's going to be
additional litigation here"); Peter H. Schuck, Reflections on Grutter (September 5, 2003),
at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumlsymposium-aalschuck-printer.php (writing that "we can
expect much future litigation over whether the use of race as a 'plus factor' in a given
affirmative action plan is excessive").
5. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
6. See infra Part I.C. and accompanying notes.
7. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational
institutions are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial
preferences in state educational institutions are OK, today's Grutter-Gratz split double
header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation."). For a
partial response to this argument, see infra notes 73-74, 108-110 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 789, 812-16 (2002).
9. The level of uncertainty could affect one's support of the Michigan opinions. See
infra note 113 and accompanying text. Yet, both questions put aside, as do I, the issue of
the correctness of Gratz and Grutter from the standpoint of Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. Certainly one could argue the substantive correctness of the decision
justifies the costs associated with the resulting legal change, but my focus - the extent of
the legal uncertainty generated by Gratz and Grutter - is different.
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This argument proceeds in two parts. Part I identifies the many
questions raised but unanswered by Gratz and Grutter. New legal
rules - whether promulgated by the legislature or announced in court
opinions - always produce legal uncertainty resolved often by the
judiciary. The primary costs associated with Gratz and Grutter are
akin to what Professor Michael Van Alstine has defined as "positive
uncertainty costs" - the uncertainty that remains even after we have
deciphered the content of the new rule." Other types of costs often
associated with new legal principles are less pronounced after Gratz
and Grutter because of the confusion existing prior to the Michigan
opinions."
Part II identifies three reasons why the areas of continuing
uncertainty identified in Part I will not lead to much litigation. The
first reason concerns the difficulty of the open questions from Gratz
and Grutter.12 To the extent we can resolve the uncertainty with
relative ease, the costs associated with the open questions are
lessened. In fact, the most important question after Gratz and
Grutter - what distinguishes constitutional racial decisionmaking from
the unconstitutional kind - is actually not as difficult as it appears
because Grutter provides ample room for other educators to consider
race and stay within constitutional boundaries."
The second reason is that we can expect little judicial
involvement in solving the more difficult questions.13 Contrary to
Justice Scalia's predictions, affirmative action opponents are not
likely to file much litigation after Grutter. Now that the Supreme
Court has ruled that race-based affirmative action predicated on
diversity can be constitutional, those opposing affirmative action are
more likely to achieve their objective of eliminating affirmative action
outside of federal court, at the state and local government level." The
federal judiciary's province is now one primarily of detail, which is
not the central concern to affirmative action opponents.
Even in evaluating the details of affirmative action programs -
which can prove critical - courts are not likely to assert much
oversight. The uncertainty will likely be resolved by the court
deferring to educators. Courts are likely to behave as they have in
other instances where the courts have supervised the constitutional
10. See Van Alstine, supra note 8, at 828.
11. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
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behavior of schools and have afforded education defendants special
status.15 That is, now that diversity can be a compelling governmental
interest, courts will be incredibly deferential to educators in
separating permissible affirmative action from the impermissible.
Courts will largely leave the details of affirmative action programs to
educators.
Third, the idea of diversity (as opposed to its implementation)
entails a relatively narrow idea of why race should matter.16 The idea
tinkers only at the edges of race-based decisionmaking, in ways
supported generally by power elites. This limited view of why race
matters further restricts the judiciary's authority in the affirmative
action debate.
Thus, what we'll likely see in the aftermath of Gratz and Grutter
is limited litigation to define more precisely how and when schools
can consider race, and an answer from the courts that defers to
educators. But after this, litigation will have only limited impact on
education today. Litigators will quickly learn - just as many of their
school desegregation counterparts have - that litigation is not the way
to effectuate social change in America, and the filing of litigation will
end. 7 In the end, Gratz and Grutter will shift the site of the
affirmative action debate to the local and state government level,
contrary to Justice Scalia's prediction. 8
I. Potential Legal Transition Costs
A. The Michigan Decisions, in Brief
In Grutter, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law
School's ("law school") program of taking into account race and
ethnicity in making offers of admission.19 Diversity was deemed to be
a compelling governmental interest, and the law school's approach
was narrowly tailored to that interest. ° The law school's program
included individual reading of each applicant's file, with no cutoff
scores under which no student would be admitted and no automatic
16. See infra notes 83, 89-91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
20. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
21. See id. at 332, 336.
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admittance scores under which students would always be admitted."
In fact, no point system guided the process. In making admissions
decisions, the school considered "'soft' variables like the
"enthusiasm of the recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate
institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, residency, leadership,
and work experience, unique talents or interests, and the areas and
difficulty of undergraduate course selection."22  The evaluation
included affording some undefined boost for "racial and ethnic
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like
African Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without
this commitment might not be represented in our student body in
meaningful numbers."23 As would be expected for giving a "plus" to
certain groups, students from under-represented minority groups had
on average lower standardized test scores and undergraduate grades
than other admitted students.2" Yet, the Court held that the law
school had not established a quota, despite the school's quest for a
"critical mass" of preferred minority students.' The Court concluded
22. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 746,750 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd,
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
23. Id. at 736.
24. Id. at 737.
25. See id. at 748-49. For example, "minority applicants with an A average and an
LSAT score down to 156 (the 70th percentile nationally) are admitted at roughly the same
rate as majority applicants with an A average and an LSAT score over a 167 (the 96th
percentile nationally)." Id. at 796 (Boggs, J., dissenting). But see id. at 748 ("Upon
inspection, however, the unsuccessful applicants' statistical evidence demonstrates just
what one would expect a plan like the Harvard plan to demonstrate - that race and
ethnicity, as 'plus' factors, play an important role in some admissions decisions.").
26. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337-338 (2003) (characterizing the law
school's program as too "flexible [and] mechanical" to be a quota). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy disagreed. See id. at 364-370 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 370-375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on the strong
correlation between the percentage of preferred minority applicants and the percentage of
preferred minority admittees. See id. at 367 (noting that "from 1995 to 2000 the
percentage of admitted applicants who were members of these minority groups closely
tracked the percentage of individuals in the school's applicant pool who were from the
same groups"). But see Sarah C. Zearfoss, Admissions of a Director, 30 HAST. CONST. L.
Q. 429,443 (2003) (positing that "the same phenomenon would be revealed for other
categories that appear in similar numbers in our applicant pool - people whose last names
begin with C or M, for example, or people haling from California and New York .... It
may simply be that when some group consistently appears as a relatively fixed percentage
of our applicant pool, odds are that they will appear in similar numbers in the pool of
admitted students."). Justice Kennedy identified the range in preferred minority students
enrolled as evidence of an unlawful quota. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (noting that from
1995 to 1998, "[t]he percentage of enrolled minorities fluctuated only by 0.3%, from
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that the law school provided an individual review for all applicants
based on a variety of soft factors, only one of which was racial and
ethnic status.
26
Yet, in Gratz the Supreme Court held that the racial preferences
in admissions at the University of Michigan College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts (hereinafter "undergraduate school") were
unconstitutional.27  Although diversity could be a compelling
governmental interest, the undergraduate program could not pass the
narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.28 Unlike the law school
program, admissions to the undergraduate program were largely
determined by a numerical score, with twenty points (out of a
possible 150) awarded to preferred minority groups. 29 Although some
students would receive individualized review, not all would." The
combination of an automatic numerical boast and limited
individualized review proved fatal, as the Supreme Court deemed the
undergraduate program a quota and thus unconstitutional.31
Justice Scalia wrote a short dissent in Grutter.32 He argued, in
part, that the Court's approach in Gratz and Grutter would increase
litigation costs.33  Specifically, Justice Scalia predicts additional
litigation on: (1) when admission practices treat an applicant as an
individual and without "'separate admissions tracts"'; (2) when a
quest for a "critical mass" becomes an unconstitutional quota system;
(3) whether schools are truly interested in diversity if they "walk the
walk of tribalism and race segregation on their campuses"; (4)
whether racial preferences "have gone below or above the mystical
Grutter-approved 'critical mass"'; and (5) whether non-preferred
minority groups can be excluded from a school's definition of a
13.5% to 13.8%). But see Zearfoss, supra, at 442, note 39 (countering Justice Kennedy's
argument).
27. See id. at 338.
28. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
29. See id. at 284.
30. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 828 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd in part,
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
31. See id. at 829-30.
32. See Gratz, 529 U.S. at 284 ("[T]his individualized review is provided after
admissions counselors automatically distribute the University's version of 'plus' that
makes race a decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented
minority applicant.").
33. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344-346 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
34. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. For a description of a more limited
claim by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, see infra note 35.
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"critical mass.34
His argument depends on two steps: defining a high level of
uncertainty in the aftermath of Gratz and Grutter and determining
that the uncertainty will be answered in the courts. If both steps are
true, then the Michigan opinions would cause high legal transition
costs that may affect one's support of the opinions. The first step of
Justice Scalia's argument is the subject of the rest of this part; the
second, the topic of Part II.
B. The Uncertainty Pre-Gratz and Grutter
To place the questions left unanswered by Gratz and Grutter in
context, we must first recognize the uncertainty attending affirmative
action before the Michigan opinions. Lower courts had split on the
validity of Justice Powell's solo opinion in Bakke, which had reasoned
that diversity could be a compelling governmental interest for race-
based admissions." They disagreed on whether diversity could ever
be a compelling governmental interest and whether current
affirmative action programs could be narrowly tailored even if
diversity were accepted as a compelling governmental interest.36
That prior uncertainty meant that at least one common cost
associated with "new" legal rules - learning the content of the new
35. See id. at 345-46. Relatedly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas also
note a potential concern for future litigation on behalf of non-preferred minority students.
See id. at 361-62 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting "the issue of
unconstitutional racial discrimination among the groups the Law School prefers" is still an
opinion question); id. at 366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the law school
offer no reasons "of why that concept [of critical mass] is applied differently among the
three underrepresented minority groups").
26. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
37. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(holding that diversity can be a compelling governmental interest), affd 539 U.S. 306
(2003); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (dicta
supporting holding in Grutter); Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d
738, 745-46 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that voluntary transfer program designed to reduce the
racial isolation of Rochester and the surrounding suburban school districts can be a
compelling state interest); and Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063
(9th Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of a race conscious admissions program for
a "laboratory" elementary school operated with a stated justification of researching to
learn how to improve "the quality of education in urban public schools"), with Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that diversity can never be a compelling
governmental interest) and Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1251, 1264 (11th Cir.
2001) (assuming that diversity can be a compelling governmental interest, but holding no
narrow tailoring); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 126-27
(4th Cir. 1999) (same); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (same); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797 (1st Cir. 1998) (same).
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rule - would occur no matter what the court were to rule in Grutter
and Gratz. 7 A "new" rule of law was inevitable given the uncertainty
over Bakke3 Even adopting Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke today
38. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 8, at 816-22.
39. The Court, in fact, adopted an approach different from that in Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion. Granted, the Grutter Court followed Justice Powell's reliance on the First
Amendment's notion of academic freedom in higher education and a presumption of good
faith on the part of colleges of universities. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 332. Justice
O'Connor also quoted from Justice Powell's opinion when crafting her notion of
deference, which was a critical step both in deeming diversity a compelling governmental
interest and in holding the law school's program as narrowly tailored. See id. at 333
("'[G]ood faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the
contrary."') (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.). See generally Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School
Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691 (2004) (analyzing Grutter's
use of deference). Yet, Justice Powell's approach to the idea of good faith, when
considered in context, is remarkably different from Grutter's idea of deference. His idea
of good faith concerned the intent to discriminate, an element that Justice O'Connor
assumes. Justice O'Connor instead uses the idea of deference to judge the legality of an
intent to discriminate. The Court, in fact, adopted an approach different from that in
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.
Justice Powell's language of good faith treatment of education administration defendants
arose in the context of his response to the argument that diversity programs are in reality
racial preference programs like an unlawful quota system. Justice Powell distinguished
the diversity program from the set-aside program by the intent to discriminate. See Bakke,
438 U.S. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("A facial intent to discriminate, however, is
evident in petitioner's preference program and not denied in this case. No such facial
infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic background is simply one
element - to be weighed fairly against other elements - in the selection process."). In
determining intent to discriminate, Justice Powell articulated an idea of good faith: "[A]
court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional
equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be presumed in the absence of a
showing to the contrary in the manner permitted by our cases." Id. at 318-19. He then
cited cases regarding proof of discriminatory intent. See id. at 319 (citing Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky., 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
Justice Powell thereby asserted that employing race as a "plus" factor is not a racial
classification as is true of a system of reserving slots for minority applicants. Thus, a
school "professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy" is presumed
not to be using the policy as a "cover" for a discriminatory policy. This could only be
overcome by proof of discriminatory intent according to traditional liability opinions. Yet,
today's jurisprudence would undoubtably deem a diversity program one with an intent to
discriminate, leaving open the question of whether the discrimination was legally
acceptable. That is, proof of discriminatory intent by the standards developed in the cases
cited by Justice Powell and subsequent ones are likely easily met in racial preferences
cases - after all the program by design is treating individuals differently because of their
race - despite Justice Powell's contrary characterization that a "plus" program is "a
facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy." See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (opinion of
Powell, J.). Thus, Justice Powell's good faith presumption has little relevance today for it is
[Vol.31:1
would still leave questions unanswered and thus create costs
associated with learning a new rule. For example, Justice Powell's
opinion would not resolve the meaning of diversity, individual review,
and narrow tailoring. Justice Powell declared that the setting aside of
a certain number of admissions slots for particular minority students
was contrary to the notion of diversity, but that some notion of
individualized review (i.e., the Harvard Plan) would be acceptable.39
But the qualities of a constitutional plan were notably absent from his
opinion, which also understandably failed to consider the many
attributes of today's diversity plans. Thus, even if the Court had
adopted wholesale Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, a new rule of law
would have to be deciphered and articulated.
Further, the uncertainty surrounding the validity of Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke also meant that other legal transition costs
would not attend Grutter and Gratz. The idea of "negative
uncertainty costs" - the loss of the certainty found under old rules -
cannot be present when courts split on defining the old "rules." ° In
short, the legal costs of change in Gratz and Grutter are lessened to a
certain extent because so much uncertainty pre-dated Gratz and
Grutter.
C. The Uncertainty Post-Gratz and Grutter
The Court in Grutter resolved some of the existing uncertainty
when it resolved the critical question of whether diversity could be
narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, but questions still remain.
likely to be overcome whenever a school admits to using racial preferences in the name of
diversity.
In many respects, Justice O'Connor's approach in Grutter is more akin to Justice
Blackmun's solo opinion in Bakke than that of Justice Powell. Justice Blackmun, who
would have upheld the medical school's affirmative action program, developed a strong
idea of deference in the context of his general comments about the contested plan. He
emphasized the importance of allowing public school officials to decide the matter for
which "the judiciary is ill-equipped and poorly trained...." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Further, he noted that "[t]he
administration and management of educational institutions are beyond the competence of
judges and are within the special competence of educators, provided always that the
educators perform within legal and constitutional bounds. For me, therefore, interference
by the judiciary must be the rare exception and not the rule." Id. This approach is more
like Justice O'Connor's because it crafts a special role for educators, based on their
superior position, at the expense of the judiciary. This is also more akin to Justice
O'Connor's allowance of deference in a broad context, as opposed to Justice Powell's
more limited view of presuming a good faith not to discriminate.
40. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.).
41. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 8, at 824-28.
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The most obvious open question is distinguishing between what
makes the undergraduate system unconstitutional and the law school
program constitutional. 1 Similarly, the Court provided little content
to the meaning of diversity,42 which will be relevant in judging the
constitutionality of challenged affirmative action programs."
The Court also left open many issues not directly raised by either
Gratz or Grutter but critical on determining the reach of the
opinions." These questions include: whether diversity can be a
compelling governmental interest in the primary and secondary
education setting, or whether that justification is unique to higher
education;45 whether the deference underlying the decision that
42. Professor Derrick Bell has written that the difference between Gratz and Grutter
"requir[e] a legal micrometer to measure...." Derrick Bell, Learning from Living: The
University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases (Sept. 5, 2003) at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/bell.php. Professor Mark V. Tushnet also
writes "that the line between the law school program, as administered, and the
undergraduate program is thinner than the Court's decisions suggest." Mark V. Tushnet,
The Supreme Court on Affirmative Action, AALS NEWSLETTER (Amer. Assoc. of Law
Schs.) Aug. 2003 (copy on file with HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY); see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Some future
lawsuits will presumably focus on whether the discriminatory scheme in question contains
enough evaluation of the applicant 'as an individual,' and sufficiently avoids 'separate
admissions tracts' to fall under Grutter rather than Gratz.").
43. The Court adopted the law school's definition of "obtaining 'the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body."' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (quoting Brief
for Respondents Bollinger, et al.).
44. I agree with others that a more detailed definition of diversity may not
necessarily be needed. For example, Professor Peter Schuck has argued as follows:
What the majority does not do is to provide a coherent account of diversity that goes
beyond generalities and platitudes, or to explain why the Constitution allows the law
school to define diversity in purely and narrowly ethno-racial terms, disfavoring minorities
other than the three favored ones (blacks, Native Americans, and the Spanish-surnamed)
and treating other kids of diversity either as much less weighty or irrelevant.
See Schuck, supra note 4, at 3. Many have argued that the implementation of diversity -
with its preferences for particular racial and ethnic groups - is inconsistent with the ideal
of diversity, which would capture more than certain racial and ethnic groups. See, e.g.,
Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573 (2000). Yet, the law school's
definition of diversity included more than racial and ethnic terms. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at
324. Granted the weight not have been significant - only a handful of overrepresented
students were admitted with scores lower than the preferred group, but the definition was
clearly an expansive one. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338; id. at 366 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Nor is it clear that greater preferential treatment is needed to achieve
diversity outside of the preferred racial and ethnic groups.
45. See Bell, supra note 4, at 1622 (noting: "Diversity invites further litigation by
offering a distinction without a real difference between those uses of race approved in
college admissions programs, and those in other far more important affirmative action
policies that the Court has rejected.").
46. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
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diversity can be a compelling governmental interest 4 6 will apply only
to elite colleges and universities; and whether diversity can be a
compelling government interest in schools outside of the admissions
setting, including whether diversity can justify racial decisionmaking
in a school's employment, recruitment, financial aid, scholarships, and
outreach and retention programs."
The answers to these questions will, in turn, raise other issues.
Two critical questions arise if diversity can be a compelling
governmental interest at the primary and secondary level.48 First, if
diversity can be a compelling government interest in the primary and
secondary education level, can it justify race-conscious busing and
other student assignment methods that do not rely on student merit?
Also left open at the primary and secondary level is the applicability
of diversity to student activities and athletics, assignments to
individual classes based on merit (i.e., ability grouping or tracking),
and curriculum and teacher training.
Justice Scalia also predicts litigation concerning whether a
university is truly committed to diversity given its other "segregative"
("Other lawsuits may focus on whether, in the particular setting at issue, any educational
benefits flow from racial diversity."); Roger Clegg, You're Not at the University of
Michigan Anymore, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 4, 3003), at
http://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/ clegg09O4O3.asp (arguing that Grutter will not be
applied at the K-12 level because of the lack of individualized consideration at this level
and that the freedom of speech ideas promoted at higher education and part of Grutter are
inapplicable at the K-12 level).
47. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.").
48. For a claim that such programs could be constitutional under Grutter, see Joint
Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Reaffirming Diversity: A Legal Analysis of the
University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases (The Civil Rights Project, Harvard
University) (2003) at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/policy/legal-docs/
Diversity_%20Reaffirmed.pdf. See also Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University and the
World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1619 (2003) ("[T]he force of [Justice
O'Connor's] perception - that affirmative action justifiably and constitutionally
contributes to making the country better through preparing students to take up certain
positions following graduation - applies to affirmative action employed following
graduation as well."); Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger:View From a
Limestone Ledge, 103 COLUM. L. REV.1596, 1599 (2003) ("Given the compelling nature of
[diversity], the Court's reasoning can logically be extended to the constellation of activities
universities undertake in the construction of their entering classes. Activities like
outreach, recruitment, and financial aid are critical to a university in making a diverse
student body possible.").
49. To the extent schools are confined to race neutral plans, Professor David I.
Levine chronicles the interesting example of San Francisco's race neutral admissions plan.
See David I. Levine, Public School Assignment Methods After Grutter and Gratz: The
View from San Francisco, 30 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 511 (2003).
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practices; 9 whether a university can "go below or above the mystical
Grutter-approved 'critical mass"'; ° and whether a minority group has
a claim that they have been "short changed" by the university's
definition of a "critical mass"'" that is too low for a minority group. 2
H. The Exit of The Judiciary
What can we expect from the judiciary in answering the
unresolved questions of Gratz and Grutter? I think the answer is "not
much." The debate over affirmative action will shift to meetings of
school boards and boards of regents, among voters over state and
local referendums, and before state legislatures - not at the federal
court house. 3  Even when called to resolve affirmative action
disputes, we can expect minimal judicial intervention. This
expectation results from three factors. First, the idea of diversity
adopted by Grutter is easily manipulated. To the extent schools wish
to consider race, Grutter gives them broad latitude and an accessible
"safe haven."" Second, the federal judiciary has demonstrated a
great willingness to defer to educators, and the hesitancy to second-
guess educators will further limit judicial involvement in the way
educators consider race.5 Third, a restructuring of society based on
the multifaceted nature of race and its effects will likely not follow
Grutter because a very narrow view of why race matters underlies the
idea of diversity." The Court has validated a concept generally
50. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("Tempting targets, one would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of tribalism and racial
segregation on their campuses - through minority-only student organizations, separate
minority housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even separate minority-
only graduation ceremonies.").
51. Id. at 345-46.
52. The law school argued successfully that it needed to admit more than a token
number of preferred minority students. Instead, it needed a "'meaningful representation"'
of such students, which was reflected in the enrollment of a "critical mass." Id. at 326
(quoting the law school's director of admissions).
53. Id. See also supra note 35 (describing the very similar claims by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas). One could also count as unsettled the applicability of
diversity outside the education setting. See Roger Clegg, Preferences Don't Work; There's
no reason for corporate America to favor minorities and women on the job, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2003, at 54 (arguing that employers should not be able to consider race to
promote diversity).
53. See infra Part I.D.
55. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
57. See infra Part II.C.
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consistent with the status quo. In doing so, the Court only works at
the margins of current education practices. This further limits the
involvement of the judiciary. In short, although the Michigan
opinions leave many questions unanswered, the federal judiciary will
have little input in resolving the unknown. Justice Scalia wrongly
predicts that an "all or nothing approach"57 would be preferable, from
the standpoint of litigation costs, than the ambiguity created by the
18Michigan opinions.
A. The Difficulty of the Unanswered Questions
First, let's consider the difficulty of the questions unanswered by
Gratz and Grutter identified herein. 9 For to the extent the questions
are easily addressed, the degree of legal uncertainty is lessened.
Difficult questions, on the other hand, create a great deal more legal
uncertainty.
What appears to be the most difficult question may be in fact be
the easiest: discerning what makes a program unconstitutional under
Gratz but constitutional under Grutter.6° There is much to be said for
why Grutter is not distinguishable from Gratz.6  Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy present compelling arguments in
Grutter about why the law school's program, even with reviewing files
individually and without assigning points to the applications of
students from underrepresented minority groups, may have
nonetheless admitted students largely because of their race." The law
school's quest for a critical mass meant, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
demonstrated, admittance figures for minorities strikingly
proportional to their application rates63 and apparently a different
58. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
59. See infra Part II.E.
60. See supra Part I.C.
61. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
62. Justices on the losing side in Gratz, in fact, made this argument. See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 296 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Although the freshman
admissions system here is subject to argument on the merits, I think it is closer to what
Grutter approves than to what Bakke condemns...."). See also Robert P. George, Gratz
and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1634, 1634 (2003) (answering the
"question [of] whether there is a reasonable basis for the distinction" between the two
Michigan opinions with "I doubt it, and so do at least six of the nine Justices").
63. But see Zearfoss, supra note 30 HAST. CONST. L. Q., at 442; id at 442, note 39
(summarizing her response as the Assistant Dean and Director of Admissions of the
University of Michigan Law School to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy).
64. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 369 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(concluding "that the Law School has managed its admissions program, not to achieve a
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definition of critical mass for each preferred minority group. 4 The
quest for a critical mass also produced a relatively tight range of
enrolled minority students.65. Lastly, the law school kept daily tabs on
the racial composition of admitted students, and consulted these
records closely toward the end of the admissions process.66 This also
suggests the emphasis of achieving particular outcomes at the expense
of individual review. In short, strong evidence indicated that the law
school was pursuing a critical mass of students at the cost of
individual treatment of applications. And yet the majority defined
the law school's policies as constitutional.67
Further, some evidence indicated that race-neutral means could
be as successful in enrolling preferred minority students as the race-
conscious programs used by the law school.68 Justice Thomas noted
the success of Boalt Hall at the University of California, Berkeley in
enrolling minority students after passage of Proposition 209, which
prohibited race-conscious state action.69 Justice Thomas also argued
'critical mass,' but to extend offers of admission to members of selected minority groups in
proportion to their statistical representation in the applicant pool."). Chief Justice
Rehnquist provided many examples, including that "in 1995, when 9.7% of the applicant
pool was African-American, 9.4% of the admitted class was African-American. By 2000,
only 7.5% of the applicant pool was African-American, and 7.3% of the admitted class
was African-American." Id. Less convincingly, Justice Kennedy also argued that the
"little deviation" of the percentage of enrolled preferred minorities in the entering class
proved the lack of individual review. See id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 366-67 (Rehnquist, C. J. dissenting) ("Respondents have never offered
any race-specific arguments explaining why significantly more individuals from one
underrepresented minority group are needed in order to achieve 'critical mass' or further
student body diversity.").
66. See id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that from 1995 to 1998 "[t]he
percentage of enrolled minorities fluctuated only by 0.3%, from 13.5% to 13.8%"). The
majority opinion noted a greater range of enrolled students by examining a longer period
of time. See id. at 337 (observing that "between 1993 and 2000, the number of African-
American, Latino, and Native-American students in each class at the Law School varied
from 13.5 to 20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota").
67. Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The consultation of daily reports during the
last stages in the admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at individual
review save for race itself."). See also id. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("Some will focus on whether a university has gone beyond the bounds of a 'good
faith effort' and has so zealously pursued its 'critical mass' as to make it an
unconstitutional de facto quota system, rather than merely 'a permissible goal."').
68. See id. at 341.
69. A more dramatic race neutral alternative would be for the law school to decrease
its selectivity and end its quest to be an "elite" institution. See id. at 344 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
70. See id. at 357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that
"[t]otal underrepresented minority student enrollment at Boalt Hall now exceeds [pre-
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that the law school's reliance on the Law School Admissions Test
("LSAT") made no sense because the test "produce[s] racially
skewed results" recognized by the law school." Yet, the Court still
held that the law school's program was narrowly tailored." This again
shows further reason to doubt close judicial monitoring of admissions
programs.
Schools that want to pursue diversity (and not all do, particularly
at the primary and secondary level where the idea of integration is
unpopular), will likely be able to do so long as they follow the law
school's approach and individually review each applicant. Grutter
provides ample wiggle room for race-conscious decisions. If the law
school's program - even with all of its implementation problems
identified by the dissenters - passes constitutional muster, then other
affirmative action programs will as well."
Proposition 209] levels").
71. Id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. On the issue of narrow tailoring, the Court considered whether the program was
a quota, whether race-neutral alternatives existed, whether nonfavored groups suffered an
undue burden, and whether the program would one day end. On all four factors, the
Court held sufficient narrow tailoring. The admissions program was not a quota because
of individualized review of all applicants, which never included any automatic, numerical
boost. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. Further, race-neutral alternatives such as devaluing
the LSAT or GPA defeated the quest for diversity and thus were not necessary. See id. at
339-40. Open admissions or other systems that would defeat the law school's elite status
were also not necessary. See id. In considering the availability of race-neutral
alternatives, a school must afford "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks." Id. at 339. No
group was unduly burdened because all the law school's broad definition of diversity
included all racial and ethnic groups. See id. at 340-41. Last, the Court agreed with the
defendants that the program would end one day, possibly within twenty-five years. See id.
at 341-42.
73. Granted, this may lead to less "candor" and more "camouflage," as predicted by
Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion in Gratz. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Bell, supra note 42, at 1628 (arguing that
"many schools will opt to abandon any overt mention of race and move toward
maintaining their minority student enrollments through the 'winks, nods, and disguises'
that Justice Ginsburg deplores"); Pell, supra note 4 (noting that "[w]ithin hours of the
[Grutter] decision, Michigan officials and others made clear they viewed last week's
decisions as little more than a fig leaf with which to hide new racial double standards);
Shelby Steele, Justice O'Connor and Her Colleagues Embrace Anti-Americanism, WALL
ST. J., June 28, 2003, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110003686 (last
visited March 26, 2004) (writing that "[u]niversities can, with confidence, take the matter
of race and admissions into the proverbial smoke-filled room where, with Cheshire grins,
they can titter at the phrase 'narrow tailoring."'); Schuck, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that
the law school's "program is sufficiently opaque by design and allows enough scope for
subjectivity and discretion in the arbitrary and undisclosed weighting of the 'soft variables'
in individual cases that a skeptic cannot prove unmistakably that race-ethnicity is not the
predominant factor in the admission of preferred minorities").
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Thus, the problem of legal uncertainty is partially abated by the
broadness of the Grutter opinion. More uncertainly would have been
generated if the Court had held that diversity could be a compelling
governmental interest, but that both the law school's and the
undergraduate school's approach were not narrowly tailored. Then
we would still be searching for a constitutional system. Instead, we
know the following: Diversity is a compelling governmental interest
and admissions officials have a fairly wide range of options to
implement a race-conscious program that will fit within the narrow
tailoring framework. Schools now will most certainly require
individual reviews of all files - the law school approach - and not rely
on the practice of assigning particular weights to preferred groups in
the admission process - the undergraduate school's program.73
This ease of meeting the example of Grutter is applicable for all
schools with selective admissions, including admission to primary and
secondary examination and magnet schools." These schools typically
admit students based on achievement and ability, and the idea of
individualized review can apply to these settings relatively easily,
although costs may be high. Grutter provides no safe haven, however,
For a contrary view, see Cliff Hocker, Affirmative Action Upheld, BLACK ENTERPRISE
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.blackenterprise.com/
ArchiveOpen.asp?Source=ArchiveTab/2003/09/0903-01.htm (Last visited March 26, 2004)
(quoting Professor Spencer Overton as saying: "'Opponents of affirmative action will try
to use the fear of future lawsuits to intimidate college administrators into backing off from
admissions programs that increase diversity."'); Levey, supra note 4, at 11 (the author, the
director of legal and public affairs at the Center for Individual Rights, the plaintiffs'
attorneys in Gratz and Grutter, contending that "[w]hile it may be safe to maneuver close
to a bright line [of Grutter], it's wise to stay far away from a fuzzy one, especially when
crossing it invites years of costly litigation or the corrupting influence of deceit"); Peter
Kirasanow, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (July 7, 2003), available at http://www.cir-
usa.org/articles/41.html(last visited March 26, 2004)(article by member of U.S. Comm'n on
Civil Rights predicting that "most colleges will not be able to meet" the standards of
Grutter, which "provide[es] powerful ammunition to preference opponents who challenge
such programs.").
74. For example, after the Court issued the Michigan opinions, the University of
Michigan announced that it would adopt the law school's approach at its undergraduate
school. See Press Release, University of Michigan, New U-M undergraduate admissions
process to involve more information, individual review (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://
http://www.umich.edu/news/index.html?Releases/2003/AugO3/admissions (last visited
March 26, 2004). Other schools made similar announcements. See, e.g., Press Release,
The University of Texas, The University of Texas at Austin proposes inclusion of race as a
factor in admissions process, (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http://
http://www.utexas.edu/opa/news/03newsreleases/nr_200311/nradmission031124.html (last
visited, March 26, 2004).
75. For case law on the constitutionality of race-based admissions at Boston's
Examination Schools, see Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797 (1st Cir. 1998).
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for schools where admission is not selective, but still includes a racial
or ethnic dynamic. For example, K-12 magnet schools with racially
weighted lottery admissions programs will be not be protected by
Grutter. By design, lotteries involve no individual review and depend
entirely on chance, which can be manipulated for certain groups but
not individuals. Grutter, with its strong emphasis on individual
review, will unlikely allow racially weighted lottery methods.7"
Primary and secondary schools also often allow voluntary transfers
for desegregative purposes,76 and whether individualized review
would work here is possible, although transfer requests are usually
treated similarly according to the reason for the transfer request,
rather than warranting individual review. The irony, of course, is
such choice-based approaches to desegregation - even outside of
litigation - have long been the preferred method of desegregation of
conservatives, who now often oppose affirmative action.77
Affirmative action principles might result in an end to voluntary
desegregative approaches long favored by those opposed to
mandatory desegregation plans, leaving schools with few
desegregation tools.78 Even if diversity is deemed a compelling
governmental interest in primary and secondary schools, choice-based
programs will have greater difficulty falling within the example of the
law school because of the absence of merit based admissions.
B. Will the Idea of Deference Have Legs?
While distinguishing the constitutional affirmative action
program from the unconstitutional will prove less difficult than others
have suggested,79 uncertainty still remains. After all, this is only one
of the many questions unanswered by the Michigan opinions.' In
approaching these questions, which can prove difficult, courts are
76. The same is also likely true for "controlled choice" plans. Under such programs,
parents can choose among a select number of schools, but their choices and their
likelihood of getting their choice are controlled to help ensure a particular racial balance.
See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 15,
163 (1995).
77. See id. at 163. The most common allows students in the racial majority at their
home school to transfer to a school where they would be in the racial minority. See id.
78. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 333-36, 421-22 (1997).
79. Professor Levine has identified race-neutral desegregation tools used in San
Francisco as a possible solution. See Levine, supra note 53, at 521.
80. See supra note 42.
81. See supra Part I.C.
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very likely to curtail their authority. As a beginning point, courts will
have the example of the Grutter Court's deferential approach. In
upholding the law school's admissions system, the Court started from
a position of deference to colleges and universities.8 ' Deference to
educational priorities proved to be a critical concept; without it the
Court could have readily deemed that diversity could not be a
compelling government interest or that the law school's program was
an unconstitutional quota not narrowly tailored to a compelling
governmental interest. The Court approached the law school from a
stated position of deference on both the question of compelling
governmental interest and narrow tailoring. Further, it left the
question of the importance of diversity to the law school's mission to
the values and opinions of others." The elevation of diversity to a
compelling governmental interest occurred not because of judicially
imposed values or identified jurisprudence. Instead, diversity
becomes a constitutionally protected ideal because of the deference
allowed to an elite law school. If courts are likely not to afford other
defendants the same degree of deference, affirmative action
opponents are more likely to see litigation as winnable. Faced with
the idea of deference, affirmative action opponents are much more
likely to lose litigation filed in the wake of Gratz and Grutter.
Further, the idea of deference greatly lessens the judiciary's decision-
making authority; it encourages courts to agree with educators rather
than impose their own substantive admissions criteria.
The deference found in Grutter will very likely have legs and be
applied in future education affirmative action opinions. Opinions
upholding race-conscious activity by educators before Grutter had
willingly adopted the "good faith" presumption on behalf of
82. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) ("The Law School's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer .... Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree
of deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed
limits."); id. at 341 (agreeing "to take the Law School at its word" that it will try its best for
the program to end one day); Parker, supra note 39 (detailing the role of deference
afforded by the majority in Grutter). The Court also relied upon the First Amendment
protections for colleges and universities. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 ("We have long
recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and though associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."). Grutter's use of deference to
school authorities is analyzed in depth in another article. See Parker, supra note 39, at
1699-1705.
83. The Court relied on findings by the District Court, social scientists, Fortune 500
Companies, and former members of the United States military in declaring the diversity
can be a compelling governmental interest. See id. at 334.
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institutions defending affirmative action that Justice Powell
articulated in his Bakke opinion.83 The earlier reliance on Bakke's
presumption of good faith on behalf of educators is entirely consistent
with Grutter's notion of deference, although differences between the
two exist,' and suggests a judicial acceptance of curtailed court
intervention.85
Further, deference is consistent with the way educators are
treated outside the affirmative action arena. Courts have crafted and
implemented special constitutional rules for educators in areas
outside of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 These principles have
limited the constitutional rights of students, on the theory that
educators need special authority for their academic mission to
84. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 748 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (noting that
"[i]n light of... Justice Powell's instruction that lower courts presume that academic
institutions act in good faith in operating their 'plus' programs, we simply cannot conclude
that the Law School is using the 'functional equivalent' of the Davis Medical School quota
struck down in Bakke."); id. at 751 ("As with the formulation and consideration of race-
neutral alternatives, some degree of deference must be accorded to the educational
judgment of the Law School in its determination of which groups to target."); Smith v.
Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Justice Powell's
language of good faith from Bakke); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061,
1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding "that courts should defer to researchers' decisions about
what they need for their research"). But see Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch.
Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding race conscious voluntary transfer program
with no concern with deference or good faith).
Not surprisingly, other courts, when holding unlawful racial preferences in admissions, had
no concern whatsoever with Justice Powell's language or idea of good faith. See generally
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cit. 2001); Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1999); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996). The First Circuit explicitly rejected a defendant's request for deference.
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that "the School
Committee must do more than ask us blindly to accept its judgment"). Bakke's
presumption of good faith is discussed further, supra note 39.
85. See supra note 39.
86. But see Levey, supra note 4, at 11 (arguing that "[o]ther judges will probably take
the court at its word that it was applying an 'exacting standard' and will be less deferential
to the 'good faith' of a defendant college, with regard to both the consideration of race
and the instituting of race-neutral alternatives") (author is the director of legal and public
affairs at the Center for Individual Rights, the plaintiffs' attorneys in Gratz and Grutter).
87. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) ("Fourth
Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment [due process] rights,
are different in public schools than elsewhere."). See generally James E. Ryan, The
Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (2000) (concluding that for
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and due process rights, "the Court has
characterized the government as acting in a special capacity - that of educator - and has
accordingly given education officials greater leeway to bend constitutional rights in order
to achieve certain education goals.").
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Likewise, in the school desegregation arena - which like
affirmative action concerns the Fourteenth Amendment - courts have
proven particularly hesitant to involve themselves in educational
policy and rarely second-guess school desegregation defendants. The
Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence has long valued
local control over schools, 8 an emphasis that harks back to as early as
1955.89 The idea of local control counsels federal courts to limit their
oversight of public schools, an idea very similar to Grutter's allowance
of deference.' Both are premised on the ideal of local educators
running schools and not federal judges. One study of district court
opinions issued from June 1, 1992, to June 1, 2002, and the opinion's
disposition on appeal found that local government defendants won in
71% of opinions, a figure that increased to 95% after omitting
opinions concerning minor issues.9' Abiding by Supreme Court
precedent, lower courts have hesitated greatly before involving
themselves in educational policy and management; instead, the courts
have been deferential to the preferences of defendants, a deference
entirely consistent with the ideal of local control actively promoted by
88. See id. at 1340 (concluding that "the more a particular policy has to do with the
academic function of schools, the more likely it is that the Court will uphold the policy,
even if it means truncating a constitutional right").
89. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (Jenkins III) ("[Ojur cases
recognize that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition."); Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) ("As we have long observed, 'local autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition."') (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,
410 (1977)); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (recognizing a "necessary
concern for the important values of local control of public school systems") (quoting
Spangler v. Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (Milliken II) (holding that
"federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local
authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution") (internal
quotation marks deleted); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743 (1974) (Milliken I) ("No
single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the
educational process ."). See also Parker, supra note 39 (analyzing the role of local control
in school desegregation).
90. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown I1) ("School
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving [school
desegregation] problems."). See also Parker, supra note 39 (detailing the role of
defendants in school desegregation remedies after Brown I).
91. See Parker, supra note 39 (noting similarities between school desegregation's
local control and Grutter's deference).
92. See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School
Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1630,1633 (2003).
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the Supreme Court.' This prior tendency toward deferring to
educators, an idea rooted in our tradition of local control of schools,
provides another strong indicator that the Supreme Court's idea of
deference will continue. Lower courts are likely to apply this familiar
concept to future cases, and thereby restrict their authority.
The idea of deference will strongly counsel courts to adopt the
position of affirmative action defendants. This in turn makes
litigation an unlikely avenue of success for affirmative action
opponents. Deference also places responsibility for resolving the
uncertainty attending the Michigan opinions outside the judiciary and
instead to educators (in the context of litigation) or other state and
local governments or voters (in the contest of ballot initiatives,
legislation, or executive policy). 93 The idea of deference strongly
suggests that courts themselves will not be deciding the questions
raised but unanswered by Gratz and Grutter.
C. The Limits of Diversity
The judiciary's responsibility over affirmative action is also
lessened by the rather limited nature of the idea of diversity.
Although the implementation of diversity can support a number of
affirmative action programs after Grutter,94  neither the
implementation nor the idea of diversity will result in a radical
restructuring of education. As before the Michigan cases, a choice
remains.95 Some schools in some states will determine that race
should not be a factor in admissions; other schools in other states will
reach a different conclusion. After all, Grutter "reaffirms the status
quo, rather than commanding change." 96  For affirmative action
opponents, the wrong is race-based decisionmaking, not the idea of
diversity. The notion of litigating the details of diversity before the
federal courts will likely not be attractive to affirmative action
opponents, particularly when courts will be deferential to educators in
93. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
94. See infra Part II.D. (exploring the possibility of affirmative action disputes
outside the court house).
95. See supra Part II.A.
96. See Torres, supra note 48, at 1598 ("Justice O'Connor was clear that mere
constitutional permission would not translate into constitutional obligation.").
97. Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All That Important?, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 8, 2003, at 10; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29
(2003) ("Public and private universities across the Nation have modeled their own
admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-conscious policies.").
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resolving the many detailed questions of diversity's implementation.'
Further, the choice of affirmative action is a rather limited one.
The ideal of diversity is a far cry from the legally repudiated goal of
remedying societal discrimination.98 As it stands now, the narrow
tailoring necessary for diversity requires individual review of
students, which limits the rationale to institutions with selective
admissions.' The idea that test scores indicate merit still continues.
10°
Nor is the goal to enroll students in proportion to their general racial
and ethnic population or to redress the gap in objective measures
used for admission. Most significantly, the majority flatly ignored
"past and continuing racial barriers."10' Instead, the goal of diversity
adopted by the law school affects the enrollment choices of a handful
of students. It is tinkering with race at the margins, and in ways
comfortable to many in power. In short, a limited policy justification
for affirmative action (diversity) further restricts the judiciary's
authority.
D. A Change of Venue
The debate over affirmative action will move from the federal
courts to the state and local level. '°2 For this reason as well, Justice
Scalia's parade of litigation onslaught overemphasizes the role the
federal judiciary will play in future. Affirmative action opponents not
only lost the quest for an absolute judicial ban, they are likely to
98. See supra Part II.B.
99. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989) (plurality opinion);
id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
100. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 65 (noting Justice Thomas's argument that continued reliance on
the LSAT may not be warranted); Bell, supra note 4, at 1629 (persuasively arguing that
"diversity serves to give undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test
scores that privilege well-to-do, mainly white applicants").
102. See Bell, supra note 4, at 1625.
103. Coyle, supra note 4 (quoting Edward Blum of the Center for Equal Opportunity
as reporting a need for "'a multifaceted attack in the courts, at the ballot box, through
grassroots organizations and in legislative bodies'); Schemo, supra note 4 (reporting that
Terence J. Pell, president of Center for Individual Rights, "contends that the real future of
affirmative action will most likely be decided at the ballot box, not in the courtroom");
Sarah-Jane Wilton, U. Colorado Regent Votes Deciding Yes in Affirmative Action Policy,
COLO. DAILY, Aug. 8, 2003, at - (reporting that state legislators intend to introduce
legislation to disallow the consideration of race in Colorado). Curt A. Levey, Director of
legal affairs at the Center for Constitutional Rights, has detailed changes at the state and
federal executive and legislative levels that could limit the reach of Grutter. Levey, supra
note 4, at 11.
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achieve only limited success in the federal judiciary.0 3 Yet, ending
affirmative action can still be achieved. Individual schools can make
that decision, or voters or legislatures can restrict the choice of
schools. California, Florida, and Washington are obvious examples of
the potential for success at the state level.' ° Not surprisingly, Ward
Connerly is hoping to duplicate his success with California and has
proposed a ballot initiative in Michigan to outlaw affirmative action.
Given that the potential for meaningful success for affirmative action
opponents exists at the state and local government level, challenges
there seem much more likely than at the federal courts.
E. Uncertainty Inevitable
Justice Scalia also argued that either an absolute prohibition or a
more open acceptance of affirmative action would have created less
legal uncertainty than the Court's Michigan opinions.'O° Justice Scalia
overstates the impact of a holding that diversity could not be a
compelling governmental interest. Such a holding would not end
litigation by affirmative action opponents. In fact, litigation might
increase.
As school desegregation has demonstrated time and time again,
educators will do their best to continue policies outlawed by the
courts. Schools would turn to ostensibly race-neutral plans to
accomplish the ends of race-based diversity plans, and litigation over
the "new" plans would almost be guaranteed. In this scenario,
affirmative action opponents would see the judiciary as a place for
success and continue litigation-based strategies.
For example, race-neutral plans, such as the percent plans, would
still be subject to claims of illegal race-based decisions, as affirmative
action opponents claimed before the Michigan opinions."°7 Further, if
104. See Coyle, supra note 4 (quoting Michael Greve of the American Enterprise
Institute as saying: "'You can continue to litigate these kinds of things [i.e., in what
settings can diversity be a compelling governmental interest], but the broader question is
settled and everything else is sort of skirmishes."').
105. See CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 31 (2003) (California Proposition 209); TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (1998) (Top Ten Percent Plan); Washington State Civil Rights
Initiative, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (2001); Fl. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999) (One
Florida Plan), available at http:// sun6.dms.state.fl.us/eog-new/eog/orders/1999/
november/eo99-281.html.1 (last visited March 9, 2004).
106. Coyle, supra note 4.
107. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2002, at A24
(writing that the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan "is unconstitutional because it was adopted
to circumvent a federal court decision striking down the use of racial preferences and
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schools could not consider race (unless remedying past
discrimination), admissions officers would still use "soft," easily
manipulated factors such as family background and overcoming of
hardship as a way to ensure minority enrollment." If racial
enrollment figures remained the same after race-conscious admissions
stopped, litigation could challenge whether race was now a hidden
factor. Courts would then have to inquire closely into actual
admissions practices to determine whether race is an admissions
factor, which will likely include detailed evidence of individual
admissions files.
That endeavor would be more difficult than the litigation pre-
Gratz and Grutter and what is expected post-Gratz and Grutter.
Before the Michigan opinions, defendants admitted their use of race;
but if diversity were not a compelling government interest, in future
cases that use of race would be hidden and thus would be subject to
intense proof and counterproof involving detailed examination of
practices into whether race-neutral measures are really a proxy for
race." Such litigation would be incredibly time-consuming, and place
judges where they least like to be - in the midst of detailed
educational decisions.
Conclusion
Without a doubt, Justice Scalia is right on one point. The Court
has created uncertainty about the reach of diversity as a compelling
governmental interest; the Michigan opinions do raise many
rewrites admissions criteria to achieve a particular racial mix"); Ron Nissimov. UT Tailors
Scholarship to Minority High Schools, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2002, at A21 (reporting
that the Center for Individual Rights is determining which scholarship program based on
high school enrollment to sue).
109. See generally, Klarman, supra note 93, at 10 (arguing that "a contrary decision in
Grutter would have been very consequential seems unlikely. As Southern whites
convincingly demonstrated after Brown, court rulings can be evaded in myriad ways.").
110. See generally Schuck, supra note 4, at 6. For example, the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA) provides extra points in the admissions process for
students who have participated in outreach programs for low-performing high schools, or
have personal challenges, low-income, or attended a low-performing high school, or are
first-generation college students. Daniel Golden, Extra Credit To Get into UCLA, It Helps
to Face 'Life Challenges,' WALL. ST. J., July 12, 2002, at Al. The law school at UCLA has
started a Critical Race Studies program, and its minority enrollment has increased. Daniel
Golden, Case Study: School Find Ways to Achieve Diversity Without Key Tool, WALL ST.
J., June 20, 2003, at Al. The University of California counts scores on SAT II's in
Spanish, including the scores of Spanish-speaking students. Daniel Golden, Admission:
Possible: Language Test Gives Hispanic Students a Leg Up in California, WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 2001, at Al.
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unanswered questions."0  But Justice Scalia overstates that
uncertainty. The Court has resolved the most fundamental
constitutional question: Can affirmative action in admissions ever be
constitutional? Not only did the Court answer that question in the
affirmative, but it also validated the law school's example. This
approach has actually created a great deal of certainty for schools."'
They can follow the law school's program with relative confidence in
legal success.
Likewise, litigation will not resolve much of the remaining
uncertainty."2 Affirmative action opponents are likely to meet quick
and extreme resistance by the courts, who have evidenced a strong
desire to absolve themselves of the responsibility for second-guessing
educators on the details of any policy. 1 3 Diversity's limited capacity
to change the status quo also restricts the authority of the judiciary."4
Further, the debate over affirmative action is likely to become one
not of constitutionality, but of utility and morality and will thus shift
to state and local governments."5 At this level, affirmative action
opponents can still achieve what they desire: an end to affirmative
action. Tinkering at the details of affirmative action before federal
111. See supra Part I.C.
112. See supra Part II.A.
113. In fact, litigation has not yet been filed. Instead, affirmative action opponents
have been filing administrative complaints with the Department of Education, Office for
Civil Rights (OCR), presumably in the hopes that the Bush Administration will be more
sympathetic than the federal judiciary has been. The Center for Equal Opportunity
(CEO) has filed a complaint with OCR about sixty programs at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University, including ones regarding financial aid, scholarships,
internship, and mentors. See Memo from Center for Equal Opportunity to Department of
Education, Office for Civil Rights, Re: OCR Complaint No. 11-03-2045 (Virginia Tech.)
(June 10, 2003) (noting OCR's agreement to investigate eight programs and supplying
additional information about other programs) (copy on file with HASTINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY). CEO has also filed a complaint against Rice
University with the OCR. See Letter from Roger Clegg, General Counsel, Center for
Equal Opportunity to Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ. (Aug. 18, 2003) (copy on file with HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
QUARTERLY). Rice quit considering race in admissions after Hopwood, but announced
after Grutter its intention to consider race again. CEO is contending that Rice's post-
Hopwood program was a sufficient race neutral alternative. Relatedly, CEO has written
The University of Texas that it believes the same to be true for that school as well. See
Letter from Roger Clegg, General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity to Larry R.
Faulkner, President, The University of Texas (Aug. 20, 2003) (copy on file with HASTINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY).
114. See supra Part II.A.-B.
115. See supra Part II.C.
116. See supra Part II.D.
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courts that are deferential to educators is likely to be a less appealing
avenue.
My analysis over the legal costs of the uncertainty generated by
Gratz and Grutter has put aside all together the question of the
substantive correctness of the decisions. Yet, the relatively low legal
costs generated by the opinions demonstrates one reason to support
them. Courts have not proven particularly adept at effectuating
change within the school setting. ' 6 Neither school desegregation
' 17
nor school finance"8  has demonstrated much potential for
restructuring education, and the same is now likely true in affirmative
action. By adopting what is essentially the status quo - granting
educators some choice in how they consider race in admissions - in
the Michigan opinions, the Court has curtailed its role in the
affirmative action debate.
117. See generally STEPHEN C. HALERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC
LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995); GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
118. The resegregation of public school is a well known trend. See, e.g., ARMOR,
supra note 76, at 172; Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, A Multiracial
Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream (The Civil Rights Project,
Harvard University) (July 2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/CharterSchools03.pdf (last
visited March 9, 2004).
119. See James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 529, 536-41 (1999).
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